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Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003 main page
CONFIDENTIAL—NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION
Draft--January 9, 2003
DOMESTIC SECURITY ENHANCEMENT ACT OF
2003
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
Title I: Enhancing National Security
Authorities
Subtitle A: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act Amendments
Section 101: Individual Terrorists as Foreign
Powers
Under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4), the
definition of
"foreign power" includes groups that engage in
international terrorism, but does not reach
unaffiliated individuals who do so. As a
result, the investigations of "lone wolf"
terrorists or "sleeper cells" may not be
authorized under FISA. Such investigations
therefore must proceed under the stricter
standards and shorter time periods set forth
in Title III, potentially resulting in
unnecessary and dangerous delays and greater
administrative burden. This provision would
expand FISA's definition of "foreign power" to
include all persons, regardless of whether
they are affiliated with an international
terrorist group, who engage in international
terrorism.
Section 102: Clandestine Intelligence
Activities by Agent of a Foreign
Power.
FISA currently defines "agent of a foreign
power" to include a person who knowingly
engages in clandestine intelligence gathering
activities on behalf of a foreign power--but
only if those activities "involve or may
involve a violation of" federal criminal law.
Requiring the additional showing that the
intelligence gathering violates the laws of
the United States is both unnecessary and
counterproductive, as such activities threaten
the national security regardless of whether
they are illegal. This provision would expand
the definitions contained in 50 U.S.C. §
1801(b)(2)(A) & (B). Any person who engages
in
clandestine intelligence gathering activities
for a foreign power would qualify a an "agent
of a foreign power," regardless of whether
those activities are federal crimes.
Section 103: Strengthening Wartime
Authorities under FISA.
Under 50 U.S.C.§ 1811, 1829 & 1844, the
Attorney General may authorize, without the
prior approval of the FISA Court, electronic
surveillance, physical searches, or the use of
pen registers for a period of 15 days
following a congressional declaration of war.
This wartime exception is unnecessarily
narrow; it may be invoked only when Congress
formally has declared war, a rare event in the
nation's history and something that has not
occurred in more than sixty years. This
provision would expand FISA's wartime
exception by allowing the wartime exception
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to be invoked after Congress authorizes the
use of military force, or after the United
States has suffered an attack creating an
national emergency.
Section 104: Strengthening FISA's
Presidential Authorization Exception.
50 U.S.C. § 1802 allows the Attorney
General to
authorize electronic surveillance for up to a
year, without the FISA Court's prior approval,
in two narrow circumstances: (1) if the
surveillance is are directed solely at
communications between foreign powers; or (2)
if the surveillance is directed solely at the
acquisition of technical intelligence, other
than spoken communications, from property
under the exclusive control of a foreign
power. In addition, the Attorney General must
certify that there is no substantial
likelihood that such surveillance will acquire
the communications of U.S. persons. (In
essence, § 1802 authorizes the
surveillance of
communications between foreign governments,
and between a foreign government and its
embassy.) Section 1802 is of limited use,
however, because it explicitly prohibits
efforts to acquire spoken communications. (No
such limitation exists in the parallel
exception for physical searches, 50 U.S.C.
§
1822(a), under which agents presumably could
infiltrate a foreign power's property for the
purpose of overhearing conversations.) This
provision would enhance the presidential
authorization exception by eliminating the
requirement that electronic surveillance
cannot be directed at the spoken
communications of foreign powers.
Section 105: Law Enforcement Use of
FISA Information.
50 U.S.C. § 1806(b) currently prohibits
the
disclosure of information "for law enforcement
purposes" unless the disclosure includes a
statement that the information cannot be used
in a criminal proceeding without the Attorney
General's advance authorization. This
provision would amend § 1806(b) to give
federal
investigators and prosecutors greater
flexibility to use FISA-obtained information.
Specifically, it would eliminate the
requirement that the Attorney General
personally approve the use of such information
in the criminal context, and would substitute
a requirement that such use be approved by the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General,
the Associate Attorney General, or an
Assistant Attorney General designated by the
Attorney General.
Section 106: Defense of Reliance on
Authorization.
50 U.S.C. § 1809(b) and 1827(b) create a
defense
for agents who engage in unauthorized
surveillance or searches, or who disclose
information without authorization, if they
were relying on an order issued by the FISA
Court. However, there does not appear to be a
statutory defense for agents who engage in
surveillance or searches pursuant to FISA
authorities under which no prior court
approval is required--e.g., pursuant to FISA's
wartime exception (50 U.S.C. § §
1811, 1829 &
1844), or FISA's presidential authorization
exception (50 U.S.C. § § 1802 &
1822 (a)). This
provision would clarify that the "good faith
reliance" defense is available, not just when
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agents are acting pursuant to a FISA Court
order, but also when they are acting pursuant
to a lawful authorization from the President
or the Attorney General.
Section 107: Pen Registers in FISA
Investigations
50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) makes FISA pen
registers available in investigations of
non-U.S. persons to "obtain foreign
intelligence information." But for U.S.
persons, the standard is much higher: in cases
involving U.S. persons, pen registers are only
available "to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence
activities." Perversely, this appears to be
stricter than the standard for pen
registers under Title III, which requires only
that it be shown that the information "is
relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation." 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a)(1).
This provision would amend § 1842(a)(1)
by eliminating the stricter standard for U.S.
persons. Specifically, FISA pen registers
would be available in investigations of both
U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons whenever
they could be used "to obtain foreign
intelligence information."
Section 108: Appointed Counsel in
Appeals to FISA Court of Review.
Under FISA, proceedings before the FISA Court
and the Court of Review are conducted ex
parte. As a result, when the Court of Review
meets to consider an appeal by the United
States, there is no party to defend the
judgment of the court below. The FISA Court
of Review thus is obliged to interpret
sensitive and complicated statutes without the
benefit of the adversary process. This
provision would amend FISA to permit the FISA
Court of Review, in its discretion to appoint
a lawyer, with appropriate security
credentials, to defend the judgment of the
FISA Court, when the United States appeals a
ruling to the FISA Court of Review. It would
also provide for the compensation of a lawyer
so appointed by the FISA Court of Review.
Section 109: Enforcement of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court
Orders.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act does
not specify the means for enforcement of
orders issued by the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court. Thus, for example, if a
person refuses to comply with an order of the
court to cooperate in the installation of a
pen register or trap and trace device under 50
U.S.C. § 1842(d), or an order to produce
records under 50 U.S.C. § 1861, existing
law provides no clearly defined recourse to
secure compliance with the court’s order.
This section remedies this omission by
providing that the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court has the same authority as a
United States district court to enforce its
orders, including the authority to impose
contempt sanctions in case of disobedience.
Sec. 110: Technical Correction
Related to the USA PATRIOT Act.
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Section 204 of the USA PATRIOT Act clarified
that intelligence exceptions from the
limitations on interception and disclosure of
wire, oral, and electronic communications
continue to apply, notwithstanding section 216
of the Act. Section 224 sunsetted several
provisions of the Act on December 31, 2005.
Although section 216 was not included in the
sunset provision, section 204’s clarifying
language was sunsetted. If not corrected,
this anomaly will result in the loss of
valuable and necessary intelligence exemptions
to the pen register and trap and trace
provisions after December 31, 2005. This
provision would eliminate this anomaly and
treat the clarifying language of section 204
the same as section 216.
Sec. 111. International Terrorist
Organizations as Foreign
Powers.
Groups engaged in international terrorism are
included under the definition of "foreign
power" in FISA. See 50 U.S.C. §
1801(a)(4). However, for certain
purposes—including the duration of
surveillance orders and the definition of what
constitutes a "United States Person"—they are
effectively excluded from the concept of
foreign powers, and accorded the more
protected treatment that FISA provides to
other entities. This section amends FISA so
that international terrorist organizations are
consistently treated as foreign powers for
these purposes.
More specifically, there are basically two
sets within the FISA definition of "foreign
power" under 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a): (i) A
paragraph (I)-(3) set, which includes foreign
governments, foreign factions, and entities
that foreign governments openly acknowledge
they direct and control. (ii) A paragraph
(4)-(6) set, which includes groups engaged in
international terrorism or preparations
therefore, foreign-based political
organizations not substantially composed of
U.S. persons, and entities directed and
controlled by foreign governments.
50 U.S.C. § § 1805(e) and 1824(d)
define the authorization periods for
electronic surveillance and physical searches
under FISA. The basic authorization and
extension periods are 90 days, but longer for
surveillance and searches relating to certain
foreign powers. Specifically, the
authorization and extension periods for
foreign powers in the paragraph (1)-(3)
set—foreign governments, foreign factions, and
entities for which foreign powers in the
paragraph (1)-(3) set—foreign governments,
foreign factions, and entities for which
foreign governments openly acknowledge
direction and control—are up to a year. In
contrast, for foreign powers in the paragraph
(4)-(6) set—international terrorist
organizations, foreign-base political
organizations not substantially composed of
U.S. persons, and entities directed and
controlled by foreign governments –the initial
authorization period is no more than 90 days.
The extension period for foreign powers in the
paragraph (4)-(6) set is also no more than 90
days, unless certain restrictions and special
finding requirements are satisfied.
(Specifically, the extension period may be up
to a year for an order relating to a foreign
–based political organization not
substantially composed of U.S. persons or an
order relating to an entity directed and
controlled by a foreign government, and up to
a year for an order relating to an
international terrorist organization that is
not a U.S. person, if the judge finds probable
cause to believe that no communication or
property of any individual U.S. person will be
acquired.)
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Another context in which different types of
"foreign powers" are treated differently is
the FISA definition of "United States person."
United States persons have a more protected
status under FISA for certain purposes, such
as dissemination of information. The existing
definition of "United States person" in 50
U.S. C. § 1801(i) categorically excludes
a corporation or association which is a
foreign power –but only if it falls in the
paragraph (1)-(3) set.
The effect of the foregoing provisions is
that, even if probable cause is established
that a group is an international terrorist
organization, it may be subject only to brief
periods of surveillance absent renewal, and it
may be accorded the protected status of a
United States person. The amendments in this
section will facilitate the investigation of
threats to the national security posed by such
groups by reassigning them to the less
protected status now accorded to foreign
powers in the paragraph (1)-(3) set. Thus,
the normal authorization and extension periods
for surveillance of international terrorist
organizations would be up to a year, and
corporations and associations which are
international terrorist organizations would
not be treated as United States persons under
FISA.
Subtitle B: Enhancement of Law
Enforcement Investigative
Tools
Section 121: Definition of Terrorist
Activities.
This section adds a definition of "terrorist
activities to the definitional section for the
chapter of the criminal code governing
electronic surveillance (chapter 119). The
definition encompasses criminal acts of
domestic and international terrorism as
defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2231 together
with related preparatory, material support,
and criminal activities. The same definition
of terrorist activities would also apply
through cross-referencing provisions, see 18
U.S.C. § 2711(1) and 3127(1) (as
amended), in the chapters of the criminal code
that govern accessing stored communications
and the use of pen registers and trap and
trace devices (chapters 121 and 206).
The surveillance chapters of the criminal code
contain many provisions which state that the
authorized surveillance activities may be
carried out as part of "criminal
investigations." Section 121 also adds a
provision to 18 U.S.C. 2510 which specifies
that "criminal investigations" include all
investigations of criminal terrorist
activities, to make it clear that the full
range of authorized surveillance techniques
are available in investigations of "terrorist
activities" under the new definition.
Section 122: Inclusion of Terrorist
Activities as Surveillance
Predicates.
This section adds terrorist activities, as
defined under the amendment of section 121,
and four specific offenses that are likely to
be committed by terrorists (the offenses
defined by 18 U.S.C. § § 37, 930©,
956, and 1993), as explicit predicates for
electronic surveillance and monitoring. It
further adds an explicit reference to
terrorist activities to the provision
authorizing electronic
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surveillance without a court order in
emergency situation—18 U.S.C. §
2518(7)—and makes conforming changes in the
corresponding provision (18 U.S.C. §
3125) for using pen registers and trap and
trace devices without a court order in
emergency situations.
The final subsection of this section modifies
the definition of "court of competent
jurisdiction" in the 18 U.S.C. § 3127(2)
to correct an unintended effect of amendments
in sections 216(c)(1) and 220 of the USA
PATRIOT Act. The purpose of the amendments
was to authorize courts having jurisdiction
over an offense to issue orders for pen
registers and trap and trace devices, and
search warrants for the disclosure of e-mails,
which could be executed outside of their
districts. However, the language utilized
inadvertently created a lack of clarity
concerning the continued validity of the
pre-existing authority of the courts to issue
such orders and warrants for execution within
their own districts (regardless of whether
they have "jurisdiction over the
offense").
This threatens to be a serious practical
problem when information gathering in the
United States is needed in response to
requests by foreign law enforcement agencies
to assist in foreign terrorism (or other
criminal investigation) and to fulfill the
Unite States’ obligations under mutual legal
assistance treaties, and in the context of
investigations relating to crimes committed on
U.S. military bases abroad, because in those
cases the U.S. courts generally do not have
jurisdiction over the offense. This section
corrects the problem in relation to pen
register and trap and trace orders through
definitional language that explicitly includes
both a court with jurisdiction over the
offense or activities being investigated, and
a court in the district in which the order
will be executed. A parallel correction for
the problem relating to search warrants for
e-mails appears in section 125(b) of this
bill.
Section 123: Extension of Authorized
Periods Relating to Surveillance and Searches
in Investigations of Terrorist Activities.
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967), the Supreme Court held for the
first time that government wiretapping was
subject to the Fourth Amendment. In response,
Congress enacted Title III of the 1968 Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ § 2510-2522, which governs
electronic surveillance for all federal
criminal offenses. Congress also subsequently
enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. § §
2701-2712, which addresses government access
to stored communications, and established
statutory standards and procedures for the use
of pen registers and trap and trace devices,
18 U.S.C. § § 3121-3127. Further,
because Katz and progeny specifically
stated that the Court did not hold the same
Fourth Amendment restrictions applied with
respect to the activities of foreign powers
and their agents, in 1978 Congress enacted the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50
U.S.C. § § 1801-1862, which
establishes standards applicable to
surveillance of foreign powers and agents of
foreign powers—including electronic
surveillance, physical searches and use of pen
registers and trap and trace devices—in
relation to the investigation of such matters
as international terrorism and espionage.
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Congress has not provided separate statutory
standards governing investigations of wholly
domestic threats to the national security,
particularly domestic terrorism. Thus, such
investigations are subject to the time limits
set forth in Title III. However, the Supreme
Court in United States v. United States
District Court ("Keith"), 407 U.S. 297
(1972), explicitly recognized that domestic
security investigations would require
different standards than those set forth in
Title III:
"We recognize that domestic
security surveillance may involve different
policy and practical considerations for the
surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’ The
gathering of security intelligence is often
long range and involves the interrelation of
various sources and types of information. The
exact targets of such surveillance may be more
difficult to identify than in surveillance
operations against many types of crime
specified in Title III. Often, too, the
emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is
on the prevention of unlawful activity or the
enhancement of the Government’s preparedness
for some possible future crisis or emergency.
Thus, the focus of domestic surveillance may
be less precise than that directed against
more conventional types of
crime."
Id. at 322. Because domestic
security investigations were subject to Title
III, despite these considerations, the Court
invited Congress to legislate new and
different standards for such
investigations:
"Given [the] potential
distinctions between Title III criminal
surveillances and those involving the domestic
security, Congress may wish to consider
protective standards for the latter which
differ from those already prescribed for
specified crimes in Title III. Different
standards may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in
relation to the legitimate need of Government
for intelligence information and the protected
rights of our citizens."
Id.
In Keith, the court noted that, with
respect to surveillance in domestic security
cases, "the time and reporting requirements
need not be so strict as those in 2528."
Id. At 323. This section accepts the
Court’s invitation and extends, in
investigations of terrorist activities, a
number of statutory time limits or periods
relating to electronic surveillance or
monitoring and searches. The specific changes
are:
(1) Amend 18 U.S.C. §
2518(5) to extend the normal duration of
electronic surveillance orders in
investigations of terrorist activities from 30
days to 90 days.
(2) Amend 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6),
which provides that an electronic surveillance
order may require periodic progress reports to
the judge who issued the order "at such
intervals as
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the judge may require." As
amended the provision would not allow reports
to be required at shorter intervals than 30
days in investigations of terrorist
activities.
(3) Amend 18 U.S.C. § 2705, which
permits delaying notification concerning the
accessing of a person’s stored electronic
communications where specified "adverse
results" would result from notification. As
amended, the provision would include
endangerment of the national security as a
specified adverse result that permits delaying
notification.
(4) Amend 18 U.S.C. § 3123 to extend
the normal authorization periods for pen
registers and trap and trace devices in
investigations of terrorist activities from 60
days to 120 days.
Section 124: Multi-function
Devices
Electronic manufacturers increasingly are
producing devices that are capable of
performing multiple functions—e.g., cell
phones that can send e-mail like a Blackberry,
and that include a calendar like a Palm Pilot.
Multiple functions are also illustrated by
ordinary home computers, which may, for
example, be used to send and receive e-mail
messages, to engage in oral communications
through an Internet phone service, to store
sent and received messages, and to store other
information. Current law does not make it
clear that the authorization (e.g., under an
electronic surveillance order) to monitor one
of a device’s functions also entails the
authority to monitor other functions.
This section accordingly amends 17. U.S.C.
§ 2518(4) to make it clear that
authorization of electronic surveillance with
respect to a device, unless otherwise
specified, may be relied on to intercept and
access communications through any of the
device’s functions. The section also
effectively allows a search warrant for other
information retrievable from the device
(whether or not related to the intercepted
communications) to be combined with the
electronic surveillance order, and makes
conforming changes in the chapters relating to
accessing stored communications and pen
registers and trap and trace devices.
The section further incorporates a correction
for an unintended consequence of amendments in
section 220 of the USA PATRIOT Act. As
discussed in relation to section 122 of the
bill above, amendments designed to authorize
courts having jurisdiction over an offense to
issue search warrants for the disclosure of
e-mails outside of their districts have
inadvertently clouded the pre-existing
authority of the courts to issue such orders
and warrants for execution within their own
districts. This section corrects the problem
by amending the pertinent language in 18
U.S.C. § 2703(b)(1)(A) and (c)(1)(A) to
refer to a court in a district in which a
provider of electronic communications service
is located, as well as a court having
jurisdiction over the offense or activities
under investigation.
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Section 125: Nationwide Search
Warrants in Terrorism
Investigations.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(a)(3)
currently authorizes judges in one district to
issue search warrants that are valid in
another district, if the crime being
investigated is "domestic terrorism or
international terrorism" as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2331. But § 2331 sets
forth an extremely narrow definition of
terrorism, as it is limited to "violent acts
or acts dangerous to human life." Thus
section 2331 arguably does not include
investigations into terrorist financing, or
other crimes that terrorist are likely to
commit. As a result, a federal judge sitting
in New York would be able to issue a search
warrant that is valid in California in an
investigation of a plot to bomb a building,
but arguably could not issue the same warrant
if the investigation concerned the raising of
money to support terrorist operations.
This provision would expand the types of
terrorism crimes for which judges may issues
search warrants that are valid nationwide.
Specifically, it would authorize nationwide
search warrants in investigations of the
offenses listed in 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(B), including computer crimes,
attacks on communications infrastructure, and
providing material support to terrorists or
terrorist organizations.
Section 126: Equal Access to Consumer
Credit Reports.
In recent years it has become increasingly
apparent that law enforcement investigators
need access to suspected terrorists’ banking
information to determine their connections to
terrorist organizations, including financial
ties. The current version of 15 U.S.C. §
1681b(a)(1) allows investigators to obtain a
suspect’s credit report—the first step in
locating his banking records—only in response
to a court order or a federal grand jury
subpoena. As a result, law enforcement cannot
obtain a suspect’s banking information without
making multiple time-consuming subpoenas. In
some cases, it can take a series of three
subpoenas—first to the credit reporting
agency, then to the suspect’s creditors, then
to the suspect’s banks—and a period of nine to
12 weeks to learn where a suspected terrorist
keeps his accounts. Perversely, the law makes
it far easier for private entities to obtain
an individual’s credit reports; under 15
U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F), a private
entity can obtain—usually within minutes—a
credit report on anyone in the United States
so long as it has a "legitimate business need"
for the information.
This provision would enable the government to
obtain credit reports on virtually the same
terms that private entities may.
Specifically, it would amend §
1681b(a)(1) to allow law enforcement officers
to obtain credit reports upon their
certification that they will use the
information only in connection with their
duties to enforce federal law. This
certification parallels the existing
requirement that a private entity must have a
"legitimate business need" before obtaining a
credit report. In addition, to avoid alerting
terrorists that they are under investigation,
this provision would prohibit (absent court
approval) disclosing to a consumer the fact
that law enforcement has sought his credit
report.
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Section 127: Autopsy
Authority.
Autopsies of the victims of terrorist attacks
and other deadly crimes, as well as other
persons, can be an effective way of obtaining
information about the perpetrators. In
addition to revealing the cause of death,
autopsies sometimes enable law enforcement to
retrieve forensic evidence (such as bomb
fragments) from the deceased’s body. The
primary need for federal autopsy authority
arises in the case of offenses, including acts
of terrorism, outside the United States. At
present, however, except in cases involving
military personnel, the United States has no
statutory authority to conduct autopsies.
When a non-military United States national
dies abroad as a result of a possible offense
against the United States, the victim’s body
typically must be transported back to the
United States before an autopsy can be
performed; this may significantly delay both
the return of the loved one’s remains to
family members, as well as cause significant
delays in the criminal investigation.
This provision would create federal authority,
in the Attorney General, to conduct autopsies
when necessary or appropriate in the conduct
of federal criminal investigations. This
authority is not limited and may be delegated
to other officers. This proposal is not
intended to result in the hiring of medical
examiners by federal law enforcement agencies.
Rather, the autopsies will be performed by
local coroners, private forensics
investigators, or the Armed Forces Medical
Examiner and his staff.
Section 128: Administrative Subpoenas
in Terrorism Investigations.
The Department of Justice currently has the
authority to issue administrative subpoenas in
investigations of a wide variety of federal
offenses, including health-care fraud see
18 U.S.C. § 3486(a)(1)(A),
immigration violations, see 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a), and false claims against the
United States, see 31 U.S.C. §
3733. But administrative subpoenas are not
available in investigations of terrorism, even
though the consequences of a terrorist attack
are far more dire than committing simple fraud
against the United States government. As a
result, law-enforcement personnel are required
to seek grand jury subpoenas before
individuals who may have information relevant
to a terrorism investigation can be compelled
to testify or provide documents.
This provision would extend the existing
administrative-subpoena authorities into
investigations involving domestic or
international terrorism. It also would
prohibit a subpoena recipient from disclosing
to any other person (except to a lawyer in
order to obtain legal advice) the fact that he
has received a subpoena. This proposal would
not give the Justice Department a unilateral,
unreviewable authority to compel production of
documents relevant to a terrorism
investigation. If recipients refuse to comply
with subpoenas, the Justice Department would
have to ask a court to enforce them. And
subpoena recipients would retain the ability,
as they do in other contexts, to ask a court
to quash the subpoena. See, e.g., In re
Administrative Subpoena, John Doe, D.P.M., 253
F. 3d 256 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Sec. 129: Strengthening Access to and
Use of Information in National Secruity
Investigations.
This section is primarily concerned with
correcting problems and weaknesses in
provisions authorizing the use of "national
security letters." In substance, national
security letters are administrative subpoenas
that may be issued by FBI officials—or in some
instances, other authorized government
officials—to obtain specified types of records
for use in national security investigations.
The existing national security letter
provisions include the following:
(1) 18 U.S.C. §
2709—Providing FBI access, in connection with
investigations of international terrorism or
espionage, to certain electronic communication
transactional records maintained by
communication service providers.
(2)
Section 625(a)-(b) of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. §
1681u(a)-(b))—Providing FBI access, in
connection with investigations of
international terrorism or espionage, to
certain consumer information maintained by
consumer reporting agencies.
(3) Section 626 of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (15 U.S.C. §
1681v)—Providing access to consumer reports
and other consumer information maintained by
consumer reporting agencies, where needed by
government agencies authorized to investigate
or carry out intelligence or analysis
activities related to international
terrorism.
(4) Section 1114(a)(5) of the Right to
Financial Privacy Act (12 U.S.C. §
3414(a)(5)—Providing FBI access, in connection
with investigations of international terrorism
or espionage, to financial records maintained
by financial institutions.
(5) Section 802(a) of the National
Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. §
436(a))—Providing access by authorized
investigative agencies to financial records
and information, consumer reports, and travel
records in relation to a person having access
to classified information, based on
indications that the person has disclosed or
may disclose classified information to a
foreign power.
Problems under these provisions include the
following: (1) The statues in which the
national security letter provisions appear
generally prohibit persons from disclosing
that they have received these requests for
information, to safeguard the integrity of the
terrorism and espionage investigations in
which national security letters are used.
However, they specify no penalty for persons
who make such unlawful disclosures. (2)
While these statues create a legal obligation
for the recipient to provide the requested
information, they do not specify any
procedures for judicial enforcement in case
the recipient refuses to comply with the
request. (3) The scope of the national
security letter provisions on the terrorism
side is generally limited to international
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terrorism, however, the distinction between
international and domestic terrorism is
increasingly elusive in contemporary
circumstances. (4) These provisions are
restrictive regarding the sharing of
information among federal agencies with
relevant responsibilities. This is in
conflict with current needs and with the broad
principles favoring the sharing of
intelligence among federal agencies under the
USA PATRIOT Act.
Subsection (a) of this section provides
appropriate penalties for violations of the
non-disclosure provisions of the national
security letter provisions. Currently, 18
U.S.C. § 1510(b) makes it an offense for
an officer of a financial institution to
notify other persons about a grand jury
subpoena or an administrative subpoena issued
by the Department of Justice for records of
the financial institution. The offense is
punishable by up to a year of imprisonment, or
up to five years of imprisonment if the
disclosure was made with the intent to
obstruct a judicial proceeding. Similarly, 18
U.S.C. § 1510(d) makes it an offense,
punishable by up to five years of
imprisonment, for an insurance company
employee to notify other persons about a grand
jury subpoena for records with intent to
obstruct a judicial proceeding.
Subsection (a) of this section adds a parallel
offense (proposed 18 U.S.C. § 1510(e))
covering violations of the non-disclosure
requirements of the national security letter
provisions described above. As with current
18 U.S.C. § 1510(b), the offense would be
a misdemeanor punishable by up to a year of
imprisonment, but would be punishable by up to
five years of imprisonment if the unlawful
disclosure was committed with the intent to
obstruct the terrorism or espionage
investigation. In addition to providing
appropriate penalties for unlawful disclosure
of national security letter requests, the
same penalties would apply to: (i) violation
of the non-disclosure requirement under 50
U.S.C. § 1861(d) for orders of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
requiring the production of records,
documents, and other tangible things in
connection with investigations to obtain
foreign intelligence information about
non-United States persons or to protect
against international terrorism or espionage,
and (ii) violation of the non-disclosure
provision of proposed 18 U.S.C. §
2332f(d) in section 129 of this bill, relating
to administrative subpoenas in terrorism
investigations.
The national security letter provisions make
compliance with the request for information
mandatory. See 12 U.S.C. §
3414(a)(5)(A); 15 U.S.C. § §
1681u(a)-(b), 1681v(a); 18 U.S.C. §
2709(a); 50 U.S.C. § 436(c). However,
they make no provision for judicial
enforcement in case this legal obligation is
not met. Subsection (b) of this section
authorizes the Attorney General to seek
judicial enforcement in such cases. This is
similar, for example, to the existing judicial
enforcement provision in 18 U.S.C. §
3486(c) for administrative subpoenas under
that section.
Subsection (c) of this section amends the
national security letter provisions relating
to electronic communication transactional
records, consumer credit information, and
financial institution records, so that they
apply in investigations of all types of
terrorist activities. The specific amendments
involve substituting, for current references
in these provisions to
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investigations relating to "international
terrorism," references to investigations
relating to "terrorist activities." The
latter notion is defined in proposed 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(20) in section 121 of this bill
so as to include domestic, as well as
international terrorism. The limitation to
international terrorism is existing law is an
impediment to the effective use of national
security letters because it may not be
apparent in the early stages of a terrorism
investigation—or even after if has continued
for some time—whether domestic or
international terrorism is involved. The
Oklahoma City bombing and the anthrax letter
incidents illustrate this point. Moreover, in
the current circumstances, domestic terrorists
who attempt to ally with or are inspired to
emulate international terrorists are an
increasing concern. The dangers posed to the
national security by such persons may be
comparable to those posed by international
terrorists, and national security letters
should likewise be an available tool in the
investigation of their criminal
activities.
Subsection (d) of this section deletes or
modifies language in the national security
letter provisions which unduly limits
information sharing among federal agencies.
For example, 18 U.S.C. § 2709 is the
national security letter provision for
electronic communication transactional
records. Subsection (d) of § 2709
states that the FBI may disseminate
information and records obtained pursuant to
that section only as provided in guidelines
approved by the Attorney General "for foreign
intelligence collection and foreign
counterintelligence investigations conducted
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and,
with respect to dissemination to an agency of
the United States, only if such information is
clearly relevant to the authorized
responsibilities of such agency." The
reference to guidelines that relate to
"foreign intelligence collection and foreign
counterintelligence investigations" is
inconsistent with the amendment proposed in
subsection (c) of this section to extend the
scope of 18 U.S.C.§ 2709 to include
investigations of domestic terrorism, as well
as international terrorism. The restrictive
language regarding information sharing with
other federal agencies is in conflict with the
principles favoring broad sharing of
intelligence among federal agencies under
section 203 of the USA PATRIOT Act (Pub. L.
107-56).
Subsection (c) of this section accordingly
deletes the restrictive language quoted above
in 18 U.S.C. § 2709(d), so that it
states simply that the FBI may disseminate
information and records obtained under 2709
only as provided in guidelines approved by the
Attorney General. Subsection (c) also makes
similar changes in the other national security
letter provisions. The general effect of the
amendments is to remove existing impediments
to the sharing of information obtained by
means of national security letters in
terrorism and espionage investigations with
other federal agencies having relevant
responsibilities.
Title II: Protecting National Security
Information
Section 201: Prohibition of Disclosure of
Terrorism Investigation Detainee
Information
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In certain instances, the release of
information about persons detained in
connection with terrorism investigations could
have a substantial adverse impact on the
United States’ security interests, as well as
the detainee’s privacy. Cf. North Jersey
Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d
198, 217-19 (3d Cir. 2002). Publicizing the
fact that a particular alien has been detained
could alert his coconspirators about the
extent of the federal investigation and the
imminence of their own detention, thus
provoking them to flee to avoid detention and
prosecution or to accelerate their terrorist
plans before they can be disrupted
Although existing Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 7(F) (5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)) permit the government
to protect information relating to detainees,
defending would be better spent detecting and
incapacitate (sic) terrorists. This provision
thus establishes a specific authority under
Exemption 3 of the FOIA to clarify what is
already implicit in various FOIA exemptions: the government need not disclose information about individuals detained in investigations of terrorism until disclosure occurs routinely upon the initiation of criminal charges.
Section 202: Distribution of "Worst Case Scenario" Information
Section 112(r) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7412(r), requires private companies that use potentially dangerous chemicals to submit to the Environmental Protection Agency a "worst case scenario" report detailing what would be the impact on the surrounding community of release of the specified chemical. Such reports are a roadmap for terrorists, who could use the information to plan attacks on the facilities.
This provision would revise section 112(r)(7)(H) of the Clean Air Act to better manage access to information contained in "worst case scenario" reports. This revised section would continue to allow such information to be shared with federal and state officials who are responsible for preventing or responding to accidental or criminal releases. However, the revised section will require that public access be limited to "read-only" methods, and only to those persons who live or work in the geographical area likely to be affected by a worst-case release from a facility.
Section 203: Information Relating to Capitol Buildings
The congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq. establishes the Office of Compliance, a congressional office that has the power to enforce OSHA standards with respect to the working conditions of legislative branch employees. OSHA often assists the Office in its work, see 2 U.S.C. 1382(e) & 1385(b), and therefore the agency sometimes obtains security-sensitive information (e.g., the layout of government buildings, and the location of air circulation equipment and ventilation ducts). Terrorists may be able to obtain this information from OSHA via a FOIA request. To ensure that congressional officials can provide necessary information with
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The assurance that it will not be publicly released, this provision makes clear that such information is exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3.
Section 204: Ex Parte Authorizations Under Classified Information Procedures Act
Under the current version of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. App. 3 1-16, courts have discretion over whether to approve the government’s request for a CIPA authorization—which enables the submission of sensitive evidence ex parte and in camera. See 18 U.S.C. App. 3 § 4 ("The court maypermit the United States to make a request for such authorization [for a protective order] in the form of a written statement to be inspected by the court alone." (emphasis added)). As a result, the government is forced to divert valuable resources to litigating this question. And even worse, a request for confidentiality itself can be a security breach: the government risks disclosing sensitive national-security information simply by explaining in open court why the information should be redacted. See, e.g., United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. 697, 707 (D.D.C. 1995) (government’s CIPA pleadings must be served "on the defendant and then litigated in an adversarial hearing").
This provision would amend CIPA to provide that courts shall allow the United States to make a request for a CIPA authorization ex parte and in camera. This amendment would not affect the showing that the United States is required to make in order to obtain a protective order, but by replacing "may" with "shall," the United States will be able to obtain the court’s guidance in every case in which classified information may potentially be discoverable, without risking disclosure of the very secrets that it seeks to protect. See United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F. 3d 1249, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998) (upholding the use under CIPA of ex parte, in camera hearings and written submissions by the government when the court is required to make discovery determinations).
Section 205: Exclusion of United States Security Requirements from Gross Income of Protected Officials
Under current tax law, certain federal officials—those whose movements are restricted, or who are required to use specific facilities, for their physical protection in the interest of the United States’ national security—may be taxed on the value of these protective "services." See 26 C.F.R. 1.132-5(m) (describing the circumstances under which police protection and related transportation expenses may be deemed to be working condition fringe benefits). Due to the recent terrorist threats, an increasing and variable number of government officials—including Cabinet and subcabinet officers, congressional leaders, and Justices of the Supreme Court—have begun to receive protective services, and now find themselves taxed on the value of those services.
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Accordingly, this provision would add a provision to the Internal Revenue Code to clarify that required security measures jointly determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence, are excludable from the gross income of the protected officials. This provision is limited to provisions from appropriate funds to be consistent with restrictions on the receipt of private funds for public purposes, and to ensure that the exclusion is limited to the public security purpose.
Section 206: Grand Jury Information in Terrorism Cases
This section amends Rule 6(e)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to make witnesses and persons to whom subpoenas are directed subject to grand jury secrecy rules in cases where serious adverse consequences may otherwise result, including danger to the national security or to the life or physical safety of an individual, flight from prosecution, destruction of or tampering with evidence, intimidation of a potential witness, or other serious jeopardy to an investigation. The provision would permit witnesses and recipients of grand jury subpoenas to consult with counsel regarding the subpoena and any testimony, but would impose the same secrecy obligations on counsel.
Title III: Enhancing Investigations of Terrorist Plots
Subtitle A: Terrorism Identification Database Section 301: Short Title.
This provision indicates that Title III, Subtitle B may be referred to as the "Terrorist Identification Database Act of 2003."
Section 302: Collection and Use of Identification Information from Suspected Terrorists and other Sources
Current law permits the FBI to establish an index to collect DNA identification records of persons convicted of certain crimes, and DNA samples recovered from crime scenes and unidentified human remains. 42 U.S.C. § 14132. However, the laws does not directly address the FBI’s authority to collect and use DNA samples of terrorists or those suspected of terrorism. It would be extremely beneficial to clarify how DNA samples from suspects, such as samples taken from unlawful combatants at Guantanamo Bay, can be used as necessary four counterterrorism and law-enforcement purposes. Section 302 would allow the Attorney General or Secretary of Defense to collect, analyze, and maintain DNA samples and other identification information from "suspected terrorists"—i.e., (1) persons suspected of engaging in terrorism as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) & (5), or committing an offense described in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B), or persons conspiring or attempting to do so; (2) enemy combatants or other battlefield detainees;
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(3) persons suspected of being members of a terrorist organization; and (4) certain classes of aliens including those engaged in activity that endangers national security.
Section 303: Establishment of Database to Facilitate Investigation and Prevention of Terrorist Activities
This provision would allow the Attorney General to establish database of DNA records pertaining to the terrorists or suspected terrorists from whom DNA samples or other identification probation offices, would be required to give the Attorney General, for inclusion in the databases, any DNA records, fingerprints, or other identification information that can be collected under this Subtitle. This provision also allows the Attorney General to use the information to detect, investigate, prosecute, prevent or respond to terrorist activities, or other unlawful activities by suspected terrorists. In addition, the Attorney General would be able to share the information with other federal, state, local or foreign agencies for the same purposes.
Section 304: Definitions
This section would establish definitions for the terms "DNA sample" and "DNA analysis." It also would define "suspected terrorist," which describes the class of individuals from whom the Attorney General may acquire DNA samples and other identification information, and whose information may be included in DNA databases.
Section 305: Existing Authorities
This provision would establish that the new authorities created by this Subtitle are in addition to any authorities that may exist under any other source of law. It also would provide that this Subtitle shall not construed to preclude the receipt, collection, analysis, maintenance, or dissemination of evidence or information pursuant to any other source of law.
Section 306: Conditions of Release.
This provision would amend several portions of the United States Code to clarify that terrorists or suspected terrorists who are under any form of federal supervision or conditional release, including parole, are subject to this Subtitle’s provisions. These individuals would be in the physical custody of the United States but for an act of governmental discretion. This section would require such individuals to cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample as a condition of supervision or conditional release.
Subtitle B: Facilitating Information Sharing and Cooperation
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Section 311: State and Local Information Sharing
Section 203 and other provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act broadened authority to share information among federal agencies that may be relevant to the detection and prevention of terrorism, and to obtain otherwise confidential information for use in terrorism investigations. That Act, however, did not adequately address the need for enhanced information sharing authority in relation to state and local officials and foreign governments, who are the critical partners of the United States in investigating terrorist crimes and preventing future terrorist attacks. This section of the bill would provide further authority for sharing of consumer credit information, visa-related information, and educational records information with state and local law enforcement, thereby enacting the remainder of the information sharing proposals that have been proposed legislatively and endorsed by the Administration and the Department of Justice. See Letter of Assistant Attorney General Daniel J. Bryant to Honorable Patrick J. Leahy concerning s. 1615 (April 30, 2002).
Section 312: Appropriate Remedies with Respect to Law Enforcement Surveillance Activities.
During the 1970s and 1980s, some law enforcement agencies—e.g., the New York City Police Department—entered consent decrees that limit such agencies from gathering information about organizations and individuals that may be engaged in terrorist activities and other criminal wrongdoing. See, e.g., Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d. 787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986). As a result, they lack the ability to use the full range of investigative techniques that are lawful under the Constitution, and that are available to the FBI. (For example, the Attorney General’s investigative guidelines authorize agents, subject to certain restrictions, to attend public places and events "on the same terms and conditions as members of the public generally.") The consent decrees also handicap officers in their efforts to share information with other law enforcement agencies, including federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. These problems threaten to frustrate the operations of the federal-state-local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and could prevent effective cooperation at all levels of government in antiterrorism efforts. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained (before September 11) in discussing one consent decree, as a result of such a decree "the public safety is insecure and the prerogatives of local government scorned. To continue federal judicial micromanagement of local investigations of domestic and international terrorist activities…is to undermine the federal system and to trifle with the public safety." Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001).
This proposal would discontinue most consent decrees that could impede terrorism investigation conducted by federal, state or local law enforcement agencies. It would immediately terminate most decrees that were enacted before September 11, 2001 (including New York City’s). All surviving decrees would have to be necessary to correct a current and ongoing
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violation of a Federal right, extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and be narrowly drawn and the least intrusive means to correct the violation. This provision is modeled on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3626, which terminated many prison-related consent decrees and which repeatedly has been upheld by the courts. Section 312 does not apply to consent decrees or injunctions remedying discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and therefore would not affect decrees or injunctions involving allegations of racial profiling.
Section 313: Disclosure of Information.
This provision provides protection against civil liability for businesses and their personnel who voluntarily provide information to federal law enforcement agencies to assist in the investigation and prevention of terrorist activities. The purpose of the provision is to encourage voluntary cooperation and assistance in counterterrorism efforts by private entities and individuals.
Subtitle C: Facilitating International Terrorism Investigations
Section 321: Authority to Seek Search Warrants and Orders to Assist Foreign States.
28 U.S.C. § 1782 does not clearly authorize the United States to obtain search warrants in response to requests from foreign governments; it only clearly applies to subpoenas. Nor is it clear that federal law enforcement can obtain orders under the pen register/trap and trace statute at foreign governments’ requests. As a result, the United States can seek search warrants only if we have entered into a treaty with the foreign government that contains a provision authorizing us to do so (and, naturally, only if the foreign government has set forth facts sufficient to establish probable cause). The same is true of pen/trap orders. The United States therefore may find itself in a situation where it cannot assist a foreign government in one of its criminal investigations, which is hardly an effective way of encouraging foreign allies to assist our own counter terrorism investigations.
This provision would modify federal law to clarify that the United States may seek search warrants, pen/trap orders, and ECPA orders, in response to the requests of foreign governments. Doing so will enhance our ability to assist foreign law enforcement investigations, as well as promote better cooperation from foreign allies when we seek evidence from within their borders.
Section 322: Extradition Without Treaties and for Offenses Not Covered by an Existing Treaty.
Many of the United States’ older extradition treaties contain "lists" or "schedules" of extraditable offenses that reflect only those serious crimes in existence at the time the treaties
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were negotiated. (For Example, our treaty with Egypt dates from 1874, and our treaty with Great Britain which includes Pakistan dates from the 1930s.) As a result, these older treaties often fail to include more modern offenses, such as money laundering, computer crimes, and certain crimes against children. While some old treaties are supplemented by newer multilateral terrorism treaties, extradition is possible under these newer treaties only if the other country is also a party to the multinational treaty, leaving gaps in coverage. Additionally, absent a few narrow exceptions, U.S. law permits the extradition of offenders to a foreign nation only when there is a treaty or convention in force with that country or a statute conferring such authority upon the executive branch. See Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5, 8 (1936). At present, there are close to seventy countries in the world with which the U.S. has no extradition treaty at all. This means that the U.S. can become a "safe haven" for some foreign criminals, and that we cannot take advantage of some countries’ willingness to surrender fugitives to us in the absence of an extradition treaty these nations usually require at least the possibility of reciprocity.
This provision would amend extradition law to: (1) authorize the U.S. to extradite offenders to treaty partners for modern crimes that may not be included in our older list treaties with those countries; and (2) provide for on a case-by-case basis and with the approval of the Attorney General and the Secretary of State extradition from the United States for serious crimes even in the absence of an extradition treaty.
Title IV: Enhancing Prosecution and Prevention of Terrorist Crimes.
Subtitle A: Increased Penalties and Protections Against Terrorist Acts.
Section 401: Terrorism Hoaxes.
In the wake of the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, a number of individuals chose to perpetrate terrorism hoaxes (e.g. sending unidentified white powder in a letter with the intent that the recipient believe it to anthrax). Such hoaxes divert law-enforcement and emergency-services resources, and thus impede our ability to respond to actual terrorist events. Current federal law does not adequately address the problem of hoaxes relating to various weapons of mass destruction. At present, the primary way to prosecute terrorism hoaxes is to use "threat" statutes—e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
2332a, which criminalizes certain threats to use a weapon of mass destruction, and 18 U.S.C. § 876, which criminalizes the use of the mails to threaten injury to a person. But some terrorism hoaxes are simply false reports that cannot easily be characterized as outright threats.
This section would amend federal law to create a new prohibition on terrorism hoaxes. In particular, it would (1) make it unlawful to knowingly convey false or misleading information, where the information reasonably may be believed, and concerns criminal activity relating to
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Weapons of mass destruction, (2) require criminal defendants to reimburse any person, including the United States, State and local first responders incident to an emergency or investigative response to the terrorism hoax; and (3) authorize a civil action for such expenses.
Section 402: Providing Material Support to Terrorism
18 U.S.C. § 2339A’s prohibition on providing material support to terrorists is unnecessarily narrow; it currently does not reach all situations where material support or resources are provided to facilitate the commission of "international terrorism." Rather, § 2339A only encompasses those acts of international terrorism which are prohibited by some other federal statue. Because, unlike the existing underlying offenses in § 2339A(a), "international terrorism" per se is not an offense under Title 18, it is prudent to establish unassailable constitutional bases for prohibiting such support. The first basis is if the material support is in or affects interstate or foreign commerce. The second basis is the regulation and control over the activities of U.S. nationals and U.S. legal entities who are outside the United States. Such control is based on, among others, the United States’ constitutional foreign affairs power. In addition, this section amends the definition of "international terrorism" to make it clear that it covers acts which by their nature appear to be intended for the stated purposes. Hence there would be no requirement to show that the defendants actually had such an intent. (there is a conforming amendment to the definition of "domestic terrorism" to maintain the existing parallel between the two definitions.)
Second, one court of appeals recently has questioned whether the current prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 2339B on providing "training" or "personnel" to terrorist organizations designated under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act are unconstitutionally vague. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno 205 F. 3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1225 (2001). But see United States v. Lindh, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___ (E.D. Va 2002) (rejecting the holding of Humanitarian Law Project). Subsection (b) would amend the pertinent statutes to remove any possible doubts about the scope of the prohibition. In particular, "training" would now be defined as "instruction or teaching designed to impart a specific skill." And criminal liability for "personnel" would apply to "knowingly provid[ing], attempt[ing] to provide, or conspir[ing] to provide a terrorist organization with one or more individuals (including himself) to work in concert with it or under its direction or control."
Section 403: Weapons of Mass Destruction
at present, the federal weapons mass destruction statute, 18 U.S.C. §
2332a, contains only only of the several constitutional bases for asserting federal jurisdiction over a terrorist attack involving weapons of mass destruction in certain circumstances: if the attack is against a person or property and "affect[s] interstate commerce." Id § 233a(a)(2). This provision would amend the statute to specifically cover property and persons in three other circumstances where federal jurisdiction constitutionally can be asserted: (I) if the mail or any facility of interstate or foreign
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Commerce is used in furtherance of the offense, (2) if the attacked property is used in interstate or foreign commerce, or in an activity that affects interstate or foreign commerce, or (3) if any perpetrator travels in or causes another to travel in interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense.
Second, with respect to attacks on government buildings, the WMD statute only applies to attacks on property owned by the United States. It currently does not directly criminalize attacks on foreign governments’ property in the United States. This section therefore amends the statute, in new Subsection 2332(a)(4), to provide for jurisdiction where the property against which the weapon of mass destruction is directed is property within the United States that is owned, leased, or used by a foreign government. (The term "foreign government" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 11.)
Third, the current version of the WMD statute does not prohibit the use of chemical weapons; in fact, it expressly states that it does not apply to attacks carried out with "a chemical weapon as that term is defined in section 229F." 18 U.S.C. §
2332a(a), (b). This restriction was added in the implementing legislation for the Chemical Weapons Convention on October 22, 1998. Removing "chemical weapons" from the ambit of the WMD statute has proven improvident, as it has created needless factual confusion in situations where the WMD contains explosive materials but no toxic chemicals, and where it contains toxic chemicals in addition to the explosive material. Since most chemical weapons will always contain some explosive material in order to cause the dispersal of the toxic chemical, it makes little sense to arbitrarily limit the scope of the use of WMD statute since the damage resulting from its use can be caused by either the explosive material, or the toxic chemicals, or a combination of both. Restoring "chemical weapons" to the scope of the WMD statute eliminates a defendant’s ability to make technical arguments that the prosecutor has charged under the wrong statute.
In addition to making the foregoing changes in the WMD statute, this section includes a technical amendment to 18 U.S.C. 175b (relating to biological agents and toxins), to correct a cross-reference to a related regulation which has been modified.
Section 404: Use of Encryption to Conceal Criminal Activity.
In recent years, terrorists and other criminals have begun to use encryption technology to conceal their communications when planning and conducting criminal activity. Title 18 of the United States Code currently contains no prohibition on the use of encrypted communications to plan or facilitate crimes. This proposal would amend federal law to provide that any person who, during the commission of or the attempt to commit a federal felony, knowingly and willfully uses encryption technology to conceal any incriminating communication or information relating to that felony, be imprisoned for an additional period of not fewer than 5 years. These additional penalties are warranted to deter the use of encryption technology to conceal criminal activity. In addition, it does not address the issue of whether software companies and internet service
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Providers should give law enforcement access to "keys" for the purposes of decoding intercepted communications.
Sec. 405. Presumption for Pretrial Detention in Cases Involving Terrorism.
Defendants in federal cases who are accused of certain crimes are presumptively denied pretrial release. 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e). Specifically, for these crimes, there is a rebuttable presumption that "no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community." The list of crimes currently includes drug offenses carrying maximum prison terms of 10 years or more, but it does not include most terrorism offenses. Thus, persons accused of many drug offenses are presumptively to be detained before trial, but no comparable presumption exists for persons accused of most terrorist crimes.
This section would amend 18 U.S.C. §
3142(e) to presumptively deny release to persons charged with crimes listed in 18 U.S.C. §
2332b(g)(5)(B), which contains a standard list of offenses that are likely to be committed by terrorists. This presumption is warranted because of the unparalleled magnitude of the danger to the United States and its people posed by acts of terrorism, and because terrorism is typically engaged in by groups – many with international connections – that are often in a position to help their members flee or go into hiding.
In addition to adding terrorism offenses to those creating a presumption in favor of detention, this section makes conforming changes in a provision describing offenses for which pretrial detention may be considered (§
3142(f)(1)) and in a provision identifying factors to be considered by the judicial officer in determining whether the defendant’s appearance and public safety can reasonably be assured through release conditions (§
3142(g)(1)).
Section 406: "Mass Transportation Vehicle" Technical Correction.
Richard Colvin Reid has been charged with attempting to blow up American Airlines Flight 63 with bombs concealed in his shoes, while over the Atlantic Ocean en route from Paris to Miami. The plane was immediately diverted to Boston. A federal grand jury sitting in the District of Massachusetts promptly indicted Reid on a variety of federal charges, including 18 U.S.C. §
1993, which prohibits wrecking a "mass transportation vehicle." (Section 1993) authorizes an aggravated penalty of up to life imprisonment when a passenger was on the mass transportation vehicle, whereas an ordinary charge under 18 U.S.C. §
32(b) permits only a 20-year prison term where no death resulted.)
The phrase "mass transportation" in section 1993 is defined by a cross-reference to 49 U.S.C. §
5302(a)(7) (the term also includes schoolbus, charter, and sightseeing transportation, 18 U.S.C. §
1993(c)(5)). In contrast to the phrase "mass transportation," the word "vehicle" has no
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Explicit definition in section 1993, nor is it defined in section 5302. Reid argued that an airplane is not a "vehicle" as that term is used in section 1993, and the district court dismissed that count of the indictment. See United States v. Reid, 206 F. Supp. 2d 132 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (holding that an "aircraft" is not a "vehicle" under 1 U.S.C.
§ 4)). This proposal specifically provides a definition of "vehicle" for the purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 1993. This definition is broad, including any apparatus that may be used as a vehicle. This provision also would make technical amendments to the relevant chapter and section names.
Section 407: Acts of Terrorism Transcending National Boundaries.
18 U.S.C. § 2332b covers killings and other serious violent crimes against persons in the United States, where "conduct transcending national boundaries" is involved. Among other grounds, federal jurisdiction exists if "any facility of interstate or foreign commerce is used in furtherance of the offense," or if the offense affects interstate or foreign commerce. However, the statute’s jurisdictional predicates are narrower than the limits contained in the Constitution. For example, the predicates do not include travel in interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense. This proposal would expand the bases for federal jurisdiction under § 2332b, including as a jurisdictional predicate travel in interstate or foreign commerce in furtherance of the offense.
The current version of
§ 2332b is deficient for the additional reason that it defines "facility of interstate or foreign commerce" to have the same meaning given that term in 18 U.S.C. §
1958(b)(2). But § 1958(b)(2) only defines "facility of interstate commerce" (to include "means of transportation and communication"), and makes no mention of foreign commerce. As a result §
2332b is ambiguous on whether the same stipulation—that "means of transportation and communication" constitute a "facility of…commerce"—applies with respect to facilities of foreign commerce. This section therefore would correct 18 U.S.C. §
1958(b)(2) so that it refers to "facility of interstate or foreign commerce" rather than simply "facility of interstate commerce."
Section 408: Postrelease Supervision of Terrorists
Section of 812 of the USA PATRIOT Act added 18 U.S.C. §
3583(j), which authorizes up to lifetime postrelease supervision for the perpetrators of terrorist offenses. In contrast, the maximum supervision period for the most serious crimes under the general rule of 18 U.S.C. §
3583(b) is five years, and for most offenses it is three years or less. The reform adopted in the USA PATRIOT Act reflects the continuing danger to the United States and its people that convicted terrorists may pose even after completion of a term of imprisonment, and legislative recognition that involvement by offenders in terrorism may be the result of persistent (or lifelong) ideological commitments that will not simply disappear within a few years of release.
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This section of the bill makes conforming amendments needed to ensure the effectiveness of the USA PATRIOT Act reform. In part, it makes conforming amendments in provisions affecting re-imprisonment on revocation of supervised release based on violations of release conditions. Currently, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3) limits imprisonment following revocation to five years in case of a class A felony, three years in case of a class B felony, two years in case of a class C or D felony, and one year otherwise. The amendments in this section do not change these maximum periods of reimprisonment , but they amend §
3583(e)(3) to make it clear that they are limitations on reimprisonment based on a particular revocation, rather than limits on aggregate reimprisonment for an offender who persistently violates release conditions and is subject to multiple revocations on that basis.
The bill also makes a complementary change in 18 U.S.C. §
3583(h). Section 3583(h) currently provides that the court may impose a term of supervised release to follow reimprisonment based on revocation of release—but not if the maximum reimprisonment term allowed by §
3583(e)(3) was imposed. Thus, the court is barred from imposing the maximum reimprisonment term—even if the maximum term is fully warranted by the nature of the offender’s violation of release conditions and resulting danger to the public—if the court wants to preserve the option of providing further supervision for the offender once the term of reimprisonment is over. Since this limitation works against the effective supervision of released terrorists and protection of the public, the bill proposes that it be eliminated.
In addition, this section provides that the sentence for terrorist offense within the scope of 18 U.S.C. §
3853(j) must include a term of supervised release of at least 10 years. By way of comparison, provisions of the drug laws that authorize extended postrelease supervision periods for certain drug offenses mandate that the sentence impose supervision terms of at least 10 years, eight years, six years, five years, four years, three years, two years, or one year for various offenses and offenders. See 21 U.S.C. §
841. The corresponding proposal for terrorists in this bill reflects the judgment that persons convicted of terrorist crimes generally pose a sufficient public safety concern that they should uniformly be subject to observation for a substantial period of time following release. This does not curtail the court’s normal authority to revisit the period of supervision imposed in the sentence at any time after one year of release, and to shorten or terminate supervision if appropriate. See 18 U.S.C. §
3583(e)(1). It does, however, reflect a judgment that the period of monitoring and oversight for offenders convicted of terrorist crimes should at least be 10 years following release, unless the court affirmatively determines thereafter that further supervision is unwarranted.
This section broadens the class of offenses subject to extended supervision periods under 18 U.S.C. §
3583(j) by deleting a limitation to offenses which result in, or create a foreseeable risk of, death or serious injury. With this amendment, the provision includes all offenses in the standard list of crimes likely to be committed by terrorists and supporters of terrorism (see 18 U.S.C. §
2332(g)(5)(B)). The existing limitation could complicate or prevent the imposition of
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appropriate supervision periods on persons convicted of non-violent terrorist offenses—such as a cyberterrorism attack on the United States that results in tens of billions of dollars of economic damage—and on persons who provide the essential financial or other material support for the apparatus of terrorism, but do not directly engage themselves in violent terrorist acts. The continuing danger posed to the national security by such persons may be no less than that posed by the direct perpetrators of terrorist violence, and the courts should be afforded the same degree of discretion in prescribing postrelease supervision in their cases.
Section 409: Suspension, Revocation and Denial of Certificates for Civil Aviation or National Security Reasons.
This section provides procedures for the suspension, revocation, and denial of pilot certificates in relation to persons who pose a threat to civil aviation or national security. There is an immediate practical need for clarification and confirmation of the authority of the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in this area because there are several pending challenges to FAA revocations by persons whose certificates were revoked following notification that they "were known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety" (49 U.S.C. §
114(h)(2)).
Section 410: No Statute of Limitations for Terrorism Crimes.
This section broadens the class of offenses that may be prosecuted without limitation of time under 18 U.S.C. §
3286(b) by deleting a limitation to offenses which result in, or create a foreseeable risk of, death or serious injury. With this amendment, the provision includes all offenses in the standard list of crimes likely to be committed by terrorists and supporters of terrorism (see 18 U.S. C. §
2332b(g)(5)(B)). The existing limitation could complicate or prevent the prosecution of persons convicted of non-violent terrorist offenses—such as a cyberterrorism attack on the United States that results in tens of billions of dollars of economic damage—and of persons who provide the essential financial or other material support for the apparatus of terrorism, but do not directly engage themselves in violent terrorist acts. The continuing danger posed to the national security by such persons may be no less than that posed by the direct perpetrators of terrorist violence, and they should not be entitled to permanent immunity from prosecution merely because they have succeeded in avoiding identification and apprehension for some period of time.
Section 411: Penalties for terrorist murders.
Existing law does not consistently provide adequate maximum penalties for fatal acts of terrorism. For example, in a case in which a terrorist caused massive loss of life by sabotaging a national defense installation in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
2144, sabotaging a nuclear facility in
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Violation of 42 U.S.C. §
2284, or destroying an energy facility in violation of 18 U.S. C. §
1366, there would be no possibility of imposing the death penalty under the statutes defining these offenses because they contain no death penalty authorizations.
In contrast, dozens of other federal violent crime provisions authorize up to life imprisonment or the death penalty in cases where victims are killed. There are also cross-cutting provisions which authorize these sanctions for specified classes of offenses whenever death results, such as 18 U.S.C. §
2245, which provides that a person who, in the course of a sexual abuse offense, "engages in conduct that results in the death of a person, shall be punished by death or imprisoned for any term of years or for life."
This section similarly authorizes uniformly up to life imprisonment or the death penalty for conduct resulting in death that occurs in the course of the offenses likely to be committed by terrorists that are listed in 18 U.S.C. §
2232b(g)(5)(B) or in the course of terrorist activities as defined in 18 U.S.C. §
2510 under the amendment in section 121 of this bill.
This section also adds the new provision covering terrorist offenses resulting in death (proposed 18 U.S.C. §
2339D) to the list of offenses in 18 U.S.C. §
3592(c)(1) whose commission permits the jury to consider imposition of the death penalty. This will make the option of capital punishment available more consistently in cases involving fatal terrorist crimes. The imposition of capital punishment in such cases will continue to be subject to the requirement under 18 U.S.C. §
3591 that the offender have a high degree of culpability with respect to the death of the victim or victims, and to the requirement that the jury conclude that the death penalty is warranted under the standards and procedures of 18 U.S.C. §
3593.
Subtitle B: Incapacitating Terrorism Financing
Section 421: Increased Penalties for Terrorism Financing.
At present, the maximum of civil penalty for violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §
1701 et seq. Is only $10,000 per violation, see 50 U.S.C. §
1705. This is a relatively mild maximum fine; the civil penalty for violations of the Clean Water Act, for example, is fully $25,000 for each day the violation persists. See 33 U.S.C. §
1319(d). IEEPA’s modest civil penalty may not adequately deter individuals who are considering engaging in economic transactions that finance terrorist organizations, or otherwise trading with prohibited persons. And given the severity of terrorist threats, and the consequences of a successful terrorist attack, the United States should be able to punish those who finance terrorism at least as severely as it can punish polluters. This proposal therefore would amend IEEPA to increase the maximum civil penalty amount from $10,000 per violation to $50,000 per violation.
Section 422: Money Laundering Through Hawalas
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Under federal law, a financial transaction constitutes a money laundering offense only if the funds involved in the transaction represent the proceeds of some criminal offense. See 18 U.S.C. §
1956(a)(1) ("represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity"); 18 U.S.C. §
1957(f)(2) ("property constituting, or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense"). There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether the "proceeds element" is satisfied as to all aspects of a money laundering scheme when two or more transactions are conducted in parallel. For example, consider the following transaction: A sends drug proceeds to B, who deposits the money in Bank Account 1. Simultaneously or subsequently, B takes an equal amount of money from Bank Account 2 and sends it to A, or to a person designated by A. The first transaction from A to B clearly satisfies the proceeds element of the money laundering statute, but there is some question as to whether second transaction—the one that involves only funds withdrawn from Bank Account 2—does so. The question has become increasingly important because such parallel transactions are the technique used to launder money through hawalas and the Black Market Peso Exchange.
Several courts have addressed related issues, holding that both parts of the parallel or later transaction (sometimes called a "dependent" transaction because it would not have occurred but for the first transaction) involve criminal proceeds for purposes of the money laundering statute. See United States v.Covey, 242 F. 3d 641 (8th Cir. 2000) (where defendant receives cash from drug dealer, and gives drug dealer checks drawn on own funds in return, transfer of checks is a money laundering offense involving SUA proceeds); United States v. Mankarious, 151 F. 3d 694 (7th Cir. 1998) (if check constituting SUA proceeds is deposited in bank account, and second check is written on that account, second check constitutes proceeds, even if first check has not yet cleared); United States v. Farrington, 2000 WL 1751996 (D.V.I. 2000) (if check constituting SUA proceeds is deposited into bank account and second check is drawn on same account on same day, second check is SUA proceeds, even though first check has not yet cleared). This proposal is intended to remove all uncertainty on this point by providing that all constitute parts of a set of parallel or dependent transactions involve criminal proceeds if one such transaction does so.
Section 423: Suspension of Tax-Exempt Status of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations.
A group that the United States formally designates as a "terrorist organization" is liable, among many measures, to have their assets frozen and their members barred from entering the United States. However, under current law, "terrorist organizations" that have registered as tax-exempt organizations under section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code can retain their tax-exempt status. And individuals who contribute to these designated "terrorist organizations" still are able to deduct those contributions.
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This section amends section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code to suspend automatically the tax exempt status of any group upon its designation as a "terrorist organization" under the several authorities. It also denies deductions for any donations made to such organizations during the period of suspension.
Section 424: Denial of Federal Benefits to Terrorists.
Current law allows federal courts to deny federal benefits to persons who have been convicted of drug-trafficking or drug possession crimes. 21 U.S.C.
§ 862. As a result, these convicts can be prohibited, for periods of up to life, from receiving grants, contracts, loans, professional licenses, or commercial licenses that are provided by a federal agency or out of appropriated funds. But despite the fact that terrorism is at least as dangerous to the United States’ national security as drug offenses, there presently is no legal authority to deny federal benefits to persons who have been convicted of terrorism crimes. This section would eliminate this inconsistency, and ensure that the same disincentives that the law creates with respect to drug crimes are available in the terrorism context, as well. Specifically, it would give federal courts the authority to deny federal benefits to any person convicted of an offense listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(B).
Section 425: Corrections to Financing of Terrorism Statute.
This section corrects a number of drafting errors in the recently enacted financing of terrorism statute, 18 U.S.C. §
2339C, and supplies a definition for the term "material support or resources" as used in that statute by cross-referencing the existing definition in 18 U.S.C.
§
2339A(b).
Section 425: Corrections to Financing of Terrorism Statute.
This section corrects a number of drafting errors in the recently enacted financing of terrorism statute, 18 U.S.C. §
2339C, and supplies a definition for the term "material support or resources" as used in that statute by cross-referencing the existing definition in 18 U.S.C.
§
2339A(b).
Section 426: Terrorism-related specified activities for money laundering.
This section adds three terrorism-related provisions to the list of specified unlawful activities that serve as predicates for the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1956. Subsection (a) adds as a RICO predicate the offense in 18 U.S.C. §
1960 (relating to illegal money transmitting businesses), which has the effect of making this offense a money laundering predicate through the cross-reference in 18 U.S.C. §
1956(b)(7)(A). Subsection (b) directly adds as money laundering predicates the new terrorist-financing offense in 18 U.S.C. §
2339C and the offense of misusing social security numbers under 42 U.S.C. §
408.
Section 426: Terrorism-related specified activities for money laundering.
This section adds three terrorism related provisions to the list of specified unlawful activities that serve as predicates for the money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C. §
1956. Subsection (a) adds as a RICO predicate the offense in 18 U.S.C. §
1960 (relating to illegal money transmitting businesses), which as the effect of making this offense a money laundering predicate through the cross-reference in 18 U.S.C. §
1956(b)(7)(A). Subsection (b) directly adds as money laundering predicates the new terrorist-financing offense in 18 U.S.C. §
2339C and the offense of misusing social security numbers under 42 U.S.C. §
408.
Section 427: Assets of Persons Committing Terrorist Acts Against Foreign Countries or International Organizations.
The USA PATRIOT Act enacted a new forfeiture provision at 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(1)(G) pertaining to the assets of any person planning or perpetrating an act of terrorism against the
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United States. This section adds a parallel provision pertaining to the assets of any person planning or perpetrating an act of terrorism against a foreign state or international organization while acting within the jurisdiction of the United States.
Section 428: Technical and conforming Amendments Relating to the USA PATRIOT Act.
This section makes a number of corrections relating to provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, mostly affecting money laundering or asset forfeiture. While essentially technical in nature, these amendments are critical, because typographical and other errors in the USA PATRIOT Act provision are preventing prosecutors from fully utilizing that Act’s tools. For example, certain new forfeiture authorities enacted by that Act refer to a non-existent statute, 31 U.S.C. §
5333, where 31 U.S.C. §
5331 is intended.
Subsection (a) makes technical corrections to a number of provisions in the USA PATRIOT Act. Subsection (b) codifies section 316(a)-(c) of that Act as 18 U.S.C. §
987. Subsection (c) adds explicit language covering conspiracies to two offenses likely to be committed by terrorists (18 U.S.C. §
§
33 and 1366), conforming to section 811 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which added conspiracy language to other terrorism offense provisions.
Title V: Enhancing Immigration and Border Security
Section 501: Expatriation of Terrorists.
Under 8 U.S.C.
§
1481, an American can lose his citizenship by voluntarily, and with the intent to relinquish nationality, taking any of a number of actions, including: (1) obtaining Nationality in a foreign state; (2) taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state; and, most importantly, (3) serving in the armed forces of a foreign state that are engaged in hostilities against the United States. The current expatriation statute does not, however, provide for the relinquishing of citizenship in cases where an American serves in a hostile foreign terrorist organization. It thus fails to take account of the myriad ways in which, in the modern world, war can be waged against the United States.
This provision would amend 8 U.S.C. §
1481 to make clear that, just as an American can relinquish his citizenship by serving in a hostile foreign army, so can he relinquish his citizenship by serving in a hostile terrorist organization. Specifically, an American could be expatriated if, with the intent to relinquish nationality, he becomes a member of, or provides material support to, a group that the United States has designated as a "terrorist organization," if that group is engaged in hostilities against the United States.
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This provision also would make explicit that the intent to relinquish nationality need not be manifested in words, but can be inferred from conduct. The Supreme Court already has recognized that intent can be inferred from conduct. See, e.g., Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 260 (1980) recognizing that the "intent to relinquish citizenship…[can be] expressed in words or…found as a fair inference from proved conduct"); see also King v. Rogers, 463 F.2d 1188, 1189 (9th Cir. 1972) ("[S]pecific subjective intent to renounce United States citizenship…may [be] prove[d]…by evidence of an explicit renunciation, acts inconsistent with United States citizenship, or by affirmative voluntary act(s) clearly manifesting a decision to accept [foreign] nationality." (citations omitted)); United States v. Schiffer, 831 F. Supp. 1166, 1194 (E.D. Pa 1993) ("Specific intent may…be proven by evidence of what steps the alleged expatriate did or did not take in connection with his expatriating acts."), aff’d without opinion, 31 F.3d 1175 (3rd Cir. 1994). Specifically, this proposal would make service in a hostile army or terrorist group prima facie evidence of an intent to renounce citizenship.
Section 502: Enhanced Criminal Penalties for Violations of Immigration and Nationality Act.
Aliens all too frequently flaunt the requirements of the Immigration and Nationality Act because that statute does not include effective criminal deterrence. There are minimal criminal penalties directly attached to fundamental violations, or there is no effective prosecution of fraudulent documents, marriage fraud, or unlawful employment of aliens. Criminal penalties in some cases are misdemeanors or require that a pattern and practice of violations be shown to warrant felony punishment. This provision would amend the INA to increase the penalties for a number of immigration crimes, including unlawful entries, alien-smuggling crimes, crimes involving fraud, and failures to depart.
Section 503: Inadmissibility and Removability of National Security Aliens or Criminally Charged Aliens.
The Attorney General does not have sufficient authority to bar an alien from the United States, or to remove an alien from the United States, on the basis of national security. The direct authority for barring admission or removing an alien does not provide sufficient authority for action based strictly on national security grounds. This provision would give the Attorney General sufficient authority to deny admission to the United States, or to remove from the United States, those individuals whom the Attorney General has reason to believe would pose a danger to the national security of the United States, based on the statutory definition of "national security" under the Act in connection with the designation of foreign terrorist organizations. The new ground of admissibility, and the new ground of removal, would parallel the authority currently granted to the Secretary of State in INA §
212(a)(3)(C)(i) to determine that an alien’s entry or activities the Secretary has reasonable grounds to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States, thereby making the alien excludable.
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In this case, the Attorney General must have reason to believe that the alien poses a danger to the national security of the United States and may deny admission. In addition, this provision would give the Attorney General the authority to bar from the United States aliens who have been convicted of, or charged with, serious crimes in other countries.
Section 504: Expedited Removal of Criminal Aliens.
Current law provides for the expedited removal of aliens in very limited circumstances. Expedited removal enables the government to quickly remove from the United States certain aliens who have been convicted of certain crimes, and renders the aliens ineligible for "discretionary relief." The expedited removal authorities (set forth in section 238(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1228(b)) only apply to nonpermanent resident aliens. In addition, only "aggravated felonies" can trigger expedited removal. But once an alien has been convicted of a criminal offense, any additional administrative process is unnecessary; a court has already found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the alien has committed the acts which render him removable. Nor is there any reason to distinguish between aliens who are permanent residents and aliens who are not: for both types of aliens, the fact of a criminal conviction suffices to establish that a person is removable.
This provision would strengthen the existing expedited removal authorities in several ways. First, it would expand the individuals subject to expedited removal to include all aliens, not just nonpermanent residents. Second, it would expand the expedited-removal-triggering crimes to include some of the offenses listed in INA §
237(a)(2)(A), (B), (C) & (D), including possession of controlled substances, firearms offenses, espionage, sabotage, treason, threats against the President, violations of the Trading with the Enemy Act, draft evasion, and certain alien smuggling crimes. Perversely, many of these offenses are far more serious than "aggravated felonies," and yet at present do not trigger expedited removal.
In addition, this provision would curtail the authorities for contested judicial removal currently codified at INA §
238(c) (8 U.S.C. §
1228(c)). Contested judicial removal has been seldom utilized because its procedures are unduly cumbersome. They require the prosecutor and district judge to try immigration relief issues which are outside their areas of expertise—issues that particularly in the criminal context are properly committed to the Attorney General’s discretion. The existing process also requires the INS Commissioner to make multiple submissions, once in presenting the immigration charges and basis, and then in responding to any relief request the aliens might make in the proceeding. The entire process significantly expands the scope of the criminal trial. The proposal to expand the streamlined administrative process to cover more aliens and more crimes would render contested judicial removal largely superfluous. This amendment would, however, preserve stipulated judicial orders as under existing subsection (c)(5). The amendment also would correct a technical error in the section numbering.
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Section 505: Clarification of Continuing Nature of Failure-to-Depart Offense, and Deletion of Provisions on Suspension of Sentence.
The existing offense of failing to depart is defined in section 243(a)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §
1253(a)(1)(A)). The statute applies to an alien’s failure to depart "within a period of 90 days from the date of the final order." While this provision reasonably can be interpreted as a continuing offense, it is conceivable that aliens who have willfully remained in the United States for several years after a final order of removal might claim that prosecution is barred by the 5 year period of limitations. (18 U.S.C. §
3282).
This amendment would clarify existing law by making it explicit that a willful failure to depart is a continuing offense. Specifically, it would amend section 243(a)(1)(A) to expressly state that it is unlawful for any alien against whom a final order of removal is outstanding willfully to remain in the United States more than 90 days after the date of the final order of removal under administrative processes, or if judicial review is had, then more than 90 days after the final order of the court.
Subsection (b) of this proposal eliminates the authority of courts under 8 U.S.C. §
1253(a) to suspend for good cause the sentence of an alien convicted of failure to depart. This authority is inconsistent with the general principles of federal sentencing law, including the 1984 Sentencing Reform Act which, among other things, abolished suspension of sentence generally for federal offenses. The ability of courts to suspend sentences for failure to depart renders the potential criminal penalties for this offense ineffective. The Department does not expect that subsection (b) would be applied retroactively to offenders whose offenses occurred prior to the date of enactment.
Section 506: Additional Removal Authorities.
This section augments the specification of places to which aliens may be removed under 8 U.S.C. §
123(b), to provide additional options where the alien cannot be removed to any country currently specified in the statute.
Transcribed by J. Kearns
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